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TOWARDS "NEVER AGAIN": SEARCHING FOR A
RIGHT TO REMEDIAL SECESSION UNDER
EXTANT INTERNATIONAL LAW
Steven R. Fishert
INTRODUCTION

On March 16, 2014, the Crimean Status Referendum was held.' The
referendum asked the people of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol 2 if they
supported political alignment with Russia or a restoration of the 1992 Crimean constitution that granted a greater degree of sovereignty than both
entities were accustomed to under the then-existing political structure with
the Ukraine) This referendum notably did not allow the option of maintaining the "status quo" of both Crimea and Sevastopol as being a part of the
Ukraine. 4 Oddities and irregularities regarding the potential desire to maintain the current political situation aside, an overwhelming majority (while
there is some variance among numerous reports, the conservative consensus
seems to be over 95%) of both Crimea and Sevastopol voted to join the
t I would like to thank several people, without whom this Article would not be
possible. First and foremost, I must thank Mike Hecker and Kevin Espinosa for their
time and patience with me while I initially grappled with these ideas. I hope they view
that time as being as productive as I believe it was. Stephanie Forman, Amanda Webber, Brittany Crowley, and Kathryn Krause were tremendously helpful with research
and were always willing debate on secession and international law generally. Their
work was instrumental in making this work and the ideas contained within what they
are. Finally, I must thank the Buffalo Human Rights Law Review, specifically my good
friends Marc Smith and Cara Cox, for helping craft my manuscript into the Article it is
today. Without your work and efforts, this Article would amount to little more than a
few disjointed thoughts.
1. Denver Nicks, Crimea Signs Treaty to Join Russia, TIME (Mar. 18, 2014), http:!
/time.com/28443/putin-paves-way-for-crimea-annexation; Crimea Referendum: Voters
'Back Russia Union,' BBC NEWS (Mar. 16, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/worldeurope-26606097.
2. Sevastopol is a city located in the Crimean Peninsula on the coast of the Black
Sea. The city has lengthy ties to Russia and is currently used under lease by the Russian
Black Sea Fleet. See generally Serhii Plokhy, The City of Glory: Sevastopol in Russian
HistoricalMythology, 35 J. CONTEMP. HIsT. 369 (2000) (providing additional information on Sevastopol).
3. Noah Sneider, 2 Choices in Crimea Referendum, but Neither is 'No,' N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 14, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/15/world/europe/crimea-votedoes-not-offer-choice-of-status-quo.html.
4. Id.; Noah Rayman, UkraineSecession Referendum Does Not Have a 'No' Option, TIME (Mar. 7, 2012), http://time.com/16318/ukraine-crimea-referendum-russia.
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Russian Federation. 5 Many commentators-including the governments of
the Ukraine, the United States, the European Union, and many other state
governments-asserted that any referendum held by a local government
without the permission of the Ukrainian government violated both Ukrainian and international law. 6 Russia and the Crimean Parliament have argued
to the contrary-claiming that the secession is legal as an exercise of the
right to self-determination, the International Court of Justice's ("ICJ") ruling in its Kosovo advisory opinion, and the precedent of the situation in
7
Kosovo and its secession from Serbia generally.
Two days after the referendum, on March 18, 2013, the Treaty on the
Adoption of the Republic of Crimea to Russia was signed, integrating Crimea and Sevastopol into the Russian Federation. 8 The Russian Federal Assembly ratified the treaty on March 21, 2013, acting to fully integrate the
5. Elisha Fieldstadt, Early Count Shows 95 Percent of Crimea Votes Want to Be
Russian, NBC News (Mar. 16, 2014), http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/ukraine-crisis/early-count-shows-95-percent-crimea-voters-want-be-russian-n54096 (asserting that
95.7% of voters elected to break away from Ukraine and join Russia); Anton Troianovski & Paul Sonne, Ukraine Region Votes to Join Russia, Wall St. J. (Mar. 16, 2014),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB 10001424052702304914904579441563920333966 (reporting over 96% of voters in the referendum voted to join Russia); Official Results: 97
Percent of Crimea Voters Back Joining Russia, CBS News (Mar. 17, 2014), http://
www.cbsnews.com/news/official-results-97-of-crimea-voters-back-joining-russia (finding 97% of voters in favor of aligning with Russia).
6. Official Results: 97 Percent of Crimea Voters Back Joining Russia, CBS News
(Mar. 17, 2014), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/official-results-97-of-crimea-votersback-joining-russia ("The U.S., EU and Ukraine's new government do not recognize
the referendum held Sunday in Crimea, saying it violates both Ukrainian and international norms."); Is Crimea's Referendum Legal?, BBC News (Mar. 13, 2014), http://
www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26546133 (indicating that leaders of the G7 all condemn the referendum in Crimea as being contrary to international law); Tom Cohn,
Legal or Not, Crimean Referendum will Shape Ukraine Crisis, CNN (Mar. 15, 2014),
http://edition.cnn.com/2014/03/13/politics/crimea-referendum-explainer (explaining the
believe that the referendum in Crimea is in violation of both Ukrainian constitutional
law and established international law).
7. Cohn, supra note 6 (reporting the Russian argument that the referendum in Crimea is legal as it is similar to Kosovo's secession from Serbia); Crimea Crisis: Russian
President Putin's Speech Annotated, BBC News (Mar. 19, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/
news/world-europe-26652058 (translating into English Russian President Vladimir Putin's speech defending Russia's treaty to integrate Crimea and Sevastopol).
8. Agreement on the Accession of the Republic of Crimea to the Russian Federation Signed, PRESIDENT OF RusSIA (Mar. 18, 2014), http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/6890;
Crimea Annexation into Russia: Putin Approves Draft Treaty to Absorb Peninsula,

(Mar. 18, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/03/18/crimeaannexation-into-russia-putin-approves-treaty n_4983534.html.
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two territories into Russia. 9 Russian forces swiftly seized control of many of
Ukraine's military bases in the region, aided by the decision of Ukrainian
leadership to withdraw Ukrainian forces in the interest of preventing the
loss of life.' 0
On the international stage, much was made of the situation in Crimea.
The United Nations Security Council debated and attempted to pass a resolution condemning the actions, only to have it blocked by Russia, a permanent member of the Security Council with veto power. " All other members
voted in favor with one state, China, abstaining. 12 The General Assembly,
however, had more luck in its actions to denounce Russia's actions. Adopting a resolution titled "Territorial Integrity of Ukraine" by a vote of 100
versus I I (with 58 abstentions) the General Assembly called on states to
not recognize any change to Ukrainian territory.' 3 The resolution asserted
the Assembly's determination that the Crimean referendum "has no validity" and that all involved parties must work together to pursue a peaceful
resolution as quickly as possible. 14 At the time of this writing, the situation
remains largely unresolved and the status of Crimea and Sevastopol will
vary from source to source.
In light of the recent events in Crimea, secession has been thrust to the
center of the public consciousness. Particular attention has been given to the
legality of secession, not just in relation to Crimea, but also generally, under
international law. Everyone from scholars to world leaders offered their interpretation of the legal status of the Crimean referendum, with the views
expressed often being as varied as those offering them. Russian President
Vladimir Putin indicated his belief that the situation in Crimea is legally

9. Russian Federation Council Ratifies Treaty on Crimea's Entry to Russia,

THE

RUSSIAN NEWS AGENCY TASS, (Mar. 21, 2014), http://tass.ru/en/russia/724749.

10. Marie-Louise Gumuchian & Victoria Butenko, Ukraine Orders Crimea Troop
Withdrawal as Russia Seizes Naval Base, CNN (Mar. 25, 2014), http://edition.cnn.com/
2014/03/24/world/europe/ukraine-crisis.
1I. UN Security Council Action on Crimea Referendum Blocked, UN NEWS SERV.
(Mar. 15, 2014), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewslD=47362#.VOIDUPnF_S.
12. Id.
13. General Assembly Adopts Resolution Calling upon States Not to Recognize

Changes in Status of Crimea Region,

UNITED NATIONS: MEETINGS COVERAGE & PRESS

(Mar. 27, 2014), http://www.un.org/press/en/2014/gal 1493.doc.htm.
14. Backing Ukraine's Territorial Integrity, UN Assembly Declares Crimea Referendum Invalid, UN NEWS SERV. (Mar. 27, 2014), http://www.un.org/apps/news/
story.asp?NewsLD=47443#.VOIDIvnF-_s.

RELEASES

BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22

acceptable following precedent set by Kosovo's secession from Serbia.' 5
President Putin declared:
Our western partners created the Kosovo precedent with their own
hands. In a situation absolutely the same as the one in Crimea they
recognized Kosovo's secession from Serbia legitimate while arguing
that no permission from a country's central authority for a unilateral
6
declaration of independence is necessary.'
President Putin argued as well that the ICJ affirmed that same assertion
as law with respect to the situation in Kosovo. 17 Conversely, much of the
international community, including both United States President Barack
Obama 18 and United Kingdom Prime Minister David Cameron, have condemned the action as violating both Ukrainian domestic law as well as international law.' 9
The controversy over secession does not, however, end with its specific and recent application to the situation in Crimea. While this incident
did certainly draw new attention to the issue, the issue itself is not new.
15. Patrick Goodenough, Crimea Vote: Putin Cites Kosovo 'Precedent,' CNS
(Mar. 16, 2014), http://cnsnews.com/news/article/patrick-goodenough/crimeavote-putin-cites-kosovo-precedent; Steven Lee Myers & Ellen Barry, Putin Reclaims
Crimeafor Russia and Bitterly Denounces the West, N. Y. TIMES (Mar. 18, 2014), http:/
/www.nytimes.com/2014/03/19/world/europe/ukraine.html.
16. Putin: Crimea Similarto Kosovo, West is Rewriting its own Rulebook, Russ.
TODAY (Mar. 18, 2014), http://rt.com/news/putin-address-pariament-crimea-562;
see
also Crimea Crisis: Russian PresidentPutin's Speech Annotated, supra note 7.
17. Putin: Crimea Similar to Kosovo, West is Rewriting its own Rulebook, supra
note 16. A more detailed discussion and analysis of the ICJ's determination in its case
concerning the Kosovo situation can be found later in this article. See infra text accompanying footnotes 244-56.
18. Coral E. Lee & Jay Solomon, Obama Warns of Sanctions Over Crimea Conflict, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 6, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405270230
4554004579422861484329156, (quoting President Obama as claiming Russia's actions
constitute illegal intervention under international law); Ukraine crisis: 'Illegal' Crimean referendum condemned, BBC NEWS (Mar. 6, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/
world-europe-26475508 (quoting President Obama as stating a referendum in Crimea
would: "violate the Ukrainian constitution and international law").
19. Crimea Vote on Russia Illegal, Says Cameron, THE TIMES (Mar. I1, 2104),
http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/world/europe/article4028884.ece; Nicholas Winning, Planned Crimean Referendum Illegal, Cameron Says, WALL ST. J. ( Mar. 10,
2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SBI0001424052702304020t045794313608863
55696 ("A planned referendum in Crimea to decide whether the region will secede from
Ukraine and become part of Russia would be illegal, illegitimate and wouldn't be recognized by the international community, British Prime Minister David Cameron said
Monday.").
NEWS
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Though secession was once the most common means by which states came
into existence, 20 it is now regarded with little short of unrelenting skepticism in most cases.2 ' During the decolonization era, peoples commonly seceded and created new states, often accompanied by revolutions and wars of
independence. 22 Despite the prevalence of secession at this time, the law
remained unclear. As the Aaland Island situation indicates, there seemed to
be little clarity over who could secede and when secession could be permissible.2 3 Even in the United Nations ("UN") era, the law on secession has
been anything but clear. The UN's judicial arm, the ICJ has struggled with
24
the issue, at least tangentially, numerous times.
It is difficult to imagine a topic in international law-save perhaps
humanitarian intervention-so fraught with dispute as secession. Some assert that unilateral secession is entirely prohibited as it would violate the
well-established principle of territorial integrity, while others argue it is
completely permissible in some cases as a means by which people may
exercise their human right to self-determination. The reality to this dilemma, as with most controversies, lies somewhere in the middle. 25 Secession may easily be understood as one of international laws' most
20.

JAMES

R.

CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

375

(2007) [hereinafter THE CREATION OF STATES].
21. Id. at 415 ("State practice since 1945 shows the extreme reluctance of States to
recognize of accept unilateral secession outside the colonial context.")
22. See id. at 375-76, 388.
23. This is plainly apparent when comparing the perceived legal secessions of
numerous states effecting decolonization with the situation of the Aalanders. Compare
infra text accompanying notes 39-48 (giving examples of wars for independence leading to secession), with infra text accompanying notes 83-140 (discussing the report of
the League of Nations Commission of Rapporteurs concerning the Aaland Islands and
the decision that the Aalanders lacked the legal ability to secede).
24. This article will specifically address the ICJ's decisions pertaining to Kosovo,
East Timor, Western Sahara, Namibia, and the Palestinian Wall. All of these decisions,
while not specifically addressing secession, deal with a related issue such as territorial
integrity or the self-determination of people. Accordingly, they are instructive on the
current legal status of secession under international law.
25. Former UN Secretary-General U Thant offers one of the most articulate expressions of this conflict in his Introduction to the Report of the Secretary General in
1971. Secretary-General Thant opined: "[a] ... problem which often confronts us, and
to which as yet no acceptable answer has been found in the provisions of the [UN]
Charter, is the conflict between the principles of the integrity of sovereign States and
the assertion of the right to self-determination, and even secession, by a large group
within a sovereign State. Here again

. . .

a dangerous deadlock can paralyse the ability

of the United Nations to help those involved." U.N. Secretary-General, Introduction to
the Report of the Secretary-Generalon the Work of the Organization, 148, U.N. Doc.

A/8401/Add.1 (Sept. 1971).
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controversial gray areas. 26 Indeed, noted scholar and current Judge of the
ICJ James Crawford has indicated that secession is neither legal nor
illegal.

27

Despite this, there have been numerous historical examples of when
secession has been accepted, either explicitly or implicitly, including several from the modern UN era. 28 The common theme to most, if not all,
accepted modem secessions is that the seceding group is or has been subjected to widespread subjugation and exploitation at the hands of the original state. 29 To use just a few examples: the Albanians in Kosovo were
subject to massive human rights violations by the Serbian government, 30 the
largely Christian population of South Sudan was subjugated by the mostly
Muslim majority in the Sudan, 3 1 and Russia has defended accusations that it
illegally intervened in Crimea by claiming that ethnic Russians living in the
region were being mistreated by the Ukrainian govemment. 32 Secession for
this purpose, correcting human rights violations, has been termed remedial
secession-that is, secession accomplished in an attempt to remediate an
ongoing situation-and will be the specific focus of this Article.

26. See JAMES CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE'S
(8th ed. 2012) [hereinafter BROWNLIE'S].

PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

141

27. Id.

28. Examples include the secession of Kosovo from Serbia and the secession of
South Sudan from the Sudan, both of which will be discussed in greater detail later in
this article. Arguably, even Crimea's secession from the Ukraine-while legally dubious for a variety of reasons-may provide further evidence as, at the time of the writing
of this article, it has not been re-integrated into the Ukraine despite severe condemnation for the secession and annexation from all corners of the international community.
29. Compare the situations in Kosovo (secession occurred with Kosovo now
widely recognized as an independent state following a genocide perpetuated by the
Serbian government), and South Sudan (now a recognized independent country where a
southern Afro-Christian population was oppressed by the northern Arab-Muslim population while a part of Sudan), with Crimea (secession has been largely condemned and

few states recognize Crimea as a legitimate part of Russian territory where there were
no reports of large-scale, wide-spread, and/or systemic discrimination against ethnic

Russians by the Ukrainian government).
30. See infra text accompanying notes 262-74 (discussing the Kosovo opinion and
situation generally).
31. See generally JAMES COPNALL, A POISONOUs

THORN IN OUR HEARTS: SUDAN

AND SOUTH SUDAN'S BITTER AND INCOMPLETE DIVORCE

(2014) (detailing the human

rights situation in South Sudan and the causes, motives, and actions concerning South
Sudan's eventual secession from Sudan).
32. See supra text accompanying notes 15-17.
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I.

GOALS

In the wake of the ICJ's Kosovo advisory opinion much was written in
the academic community about remedial secession. While many scholars
have discussed what this comment will term remedial secession-with
some going as far as to argue that perhaps such a right to secession should
exist-few, if any, asserted that it did exist. 33 This comment seeks to accomplish that. Since Kosovo, the international landscape has changed immeasurably. State practice has become more favorable to a right to remedial
secession in certain, limited circumstances. Viewed in totality, current international law may support a cognizable right to remedial secession.
This comment will assert that there does currently exist a right to remedial secession under extant international law. In doing so, it will review
the history of secession and the jus cogens right to self-determination 34 that
is frequently asserted as providing the legal basis for secession. It will argue
that two of the most commonly posited justifications for secession-secession to cure egregious human rights violations (what is often termed-and
what this comment will call-remedial secession) and secession as an expression of external self-determination where a people are unable to effect
meaningful internal self-determination-are, de facto, the same. Finally,
this comment will briefly attempt to synthesize the extant law of self-determination and secession and attempt to create a unified rule for when, if
ever, remedial secession is permissible under international law.

II.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES AND FRAMEWORK

To understand the current state of secession it is necessary to examine
the historical background of the concept. Prior to World War I, secession
was likely the most common means of creating a new state. 35 Secession at
this time was widely thought of as involving the threat or use of force
against a sovereign in an effort to gain political independence from that
33. See, e.g., Joshua Castellino, TerritorialIntegrity and the "Right" to Self-Determination: An Examinationof the ConceptualTools, 33 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 503, 56568 (2008); Thomas W. Simon, Remedial Secession: What the Law Should Have Done,
from Katangato Kosovo, 40 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 105, 172-73 (2011); Jure Vidmar,
InternationalLegal Responses to Kosovo's Declarationof Independence, 42 VA. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 779, 849-51 (2009).

34. Ajus cogens right (also known as a peremptory norm) is one from which no
derogation is legally permitted. BROWNLIE'S, supra note 26, at 594. The right of a people to self-determination is accepted as ajus cogens right. Int'l Law Comm'n, Fragmentation of Int'l Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification & Expansion of Int'l
Law, [ 33, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.702 (July 18, 2006).
35. THE CREATION OF STATES, supra note 20, at 375.
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sovereign; what historians would generally term a war of independence or
revolutionary war. 36 This pre-World War I period saw numerous secessionist movements, many accompanied by violence and done with the aim of
37
overthrowing colonial rule.
The most notable example is likely the American Revolutionary War,
where thirteen of Great Britain's North American colonies fought an almost
eight-year war for independence. 38 Similarly, in Central and South America
numerous wars of independence resulted in the secession of Brazil from
Portugal in 1822. 39 Not to be outdone by its Iberian rival, Spain lost numerous wars resulting in the secession of colonies during this period. Ecuador-then part of Gran Columbia-gained its independence in 1822,40 the
last Spanish troops surrendered to Chile in 182641 (though some argue that
Chile effectively seceded in 1821),42 and Peru seceded from the Spanish
Empire in 1824, 43 to name just a few. 44 Mexico achieved its independence
from Spain, after over a decade of fighting, in 1821. 45 Not only limited to
the Americas, this was a global trend, with Greece effecting its secession
from the Ottoman Empire in 183246 and Belgium seceding from the Netherlands in 1831.47
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. See generally JACK

RAKOVE, REVOLUTIONARIES: A NEW HISTORY OF THE IN(2010); LELAND G. STAUBER, THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: A
(2010) (discussing the history of the American Revolution).

VENTION OF AMERICA
GRAND MISTAKE

39. See generally GABRIEL

PAQUETTE, IMPERIAL PORTUGAL IN THE AGE OF AT-

1770-1850 (2013) (providing a
detailed analysis on the history, causes, and legacy of the independence of Brazil).
40. See DAVID W. SCHODT, ECUADOR: AN ANDEAN ENIGMA 26-29 (1978).
41. See also SIMON COLLIER & WILLIAM F. SATER, A HISTORY OF CHILE: 18082002 (2004). See generally SIMON COLLIER, IDEAS AND POLITICS OF CHILEAN INDEPENDENCE 1808-1833 (1967).
42. The 1921 date comes from the expulsion of the Royalist forces from what
would become mainland Chile. See, generally, COLLIER, supra note 41 (discussing the
Chilean independence movement and its associated dates).
43. See TIMOTHY E. ANNA, THE FALL OF THE ROYAL GOVERNMENT IN PERU 22038 (1979).
44. For further information and discussion on the history of the decolonization of
Central and South America see CONNECTIONS AFTER COLONIALISM: EUROPE AND LATIN
AMERICA IN THE 1820s (Matthew Brown & Gabriel Paquette eds., 2013).
45. See THOMAS BENJAMIN, LA REVOLUCION: MEXICO'S GREAT REVOLUTION AS
MEMORY, MYTH, AND HISTORY 101 (2000).
46. C.M. WOODHOUSE, THE GREEK WAR OF INDEPENDENCE: ITS HISTORICAL SETLANTIC REVOLUTION: THE LUsO-BRAZILIAN WORLD, C.

TING

148-49 (discussing international recognition of an independent Greece in 1832).

47.

DANIEL

H.

THOMAS, THE GUARANTEE OF BELGIAN INDEPENDENCE AND NEU-

TRALITY IN EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY,

1830's-1930's 21 (1983).
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After World War II, a new period of secessions began. Similar to the
pre-World War I secessions, they were accomplished by groups of people
seeking independence from colonial rule. 48 Unlike the earlier secessions,
however, these were generally accomplished with the consent of the former
colonizing power.4 9 The UN Charter declared that among the purposes of
the UN was "[t]o develop friendly relations among nations based on respect
for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples. '50 This
nod to self-determination ushered in a period of voluntary decolonization
where most states endeavored to grant independence to their former colonies. 5' Despite the willingness to support secession in an effort to effect
decolonization, outside of that context the international community has
been reluctant to accept unilateral secession.5 2 Indeed, since the end of
World War II, no state created by unilateral secession has gained UN recognition over the objections of the predecessor state. 53 When permissible unilateral secession is referenced outside of decolonization, it is done in one of
55
two ways. 54 First, as remedial secession to cure human rights violations.
Or, in the alternative, to provide the seceding people with a means to exercise their right to self-determination where they are being denied the means
to exercise the same right within their current state.5 6 In addressing the issue
head-on, the ICJ elected to not determine whether or not remedial secession
itself is inherently legal or illegal, thus leaving the issue open for further
57
interpretation and, perhaps, litigation.
III.

SECESSION AS AN EXPRESSION OF SELF-DETERMINATION

The conclusion of World War II ushered in a new era of international
relations. The formation of the UN and the Cold War combined to create
the modern framework for international law. Views on secession shifted, as
the prevailing thought was that the state was the smallest unit in the international system. That is to say, a UN member state was indivisible in the
48. THE
49. Id.

CREATION OF STATES,

supra note 20, at 375.

50. U.N. Charter art. 1, 2.
THE CREATION OF STATES, supra note 20, at 375.
52. Id. at 390.
53. Id.
54. Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, para. 138 (Can.)

51.

[hereinafter Quebec]; BROWNLIE'S, supra note 26, at 142.
55. Quebec, supra note 54, para. 133.
56. Id. para. 134.

57. Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. Rep. 403, paras. 82-83
(July 22) [hereinafter Kosovo]; BROWNLIE'S, supra note 26, at 142.

270
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international system. As such, it followed that any movements or attempts
to partition such a state would be met with resistance. Doing so could upset
the delicate balance of peace that was established following World War II.
Gone were the times when secession was the most common method of state
creation, as the international community attempted to settle its borders. Despite this fact, discussion of secessions continued.
The most prevalent lens through which secession is discussed in modern international law is as an expression of a people's right to self-determination. 58 A people's right to self-determination is generally understood to
be exercised internally, that is, via the democratic mechanisms within the
people's state. 59 However, because of the irreproachable nature of the right
to self-determination there are circumstances where, lacking any effective
means of exercising internal self-determination, a people may be entitled to
use external self-determination to attain their rights. 60 This external expression of self-determination would cleave the state, preventing the people
from exercising their rights, resulting in a new state where self-determina61
tion rights would be used internally.
A.

Pre-UN Era

Discussion of a right to self-determination can be found dating back to
the beginnings of modem international law and the writings of Hugo GrotiUs. 62 In his work De Jure Belli ac Pacis (On the Law of War and Peace),
Grotius gives an early discussion on man's inherent right to self-determina64
tion. 63 Grotius begins by defining a "right" as it pertains to individuals.
For Grotius a right in this sense is a "moral quality annexed to the person,

justly entitling him to possess some particular privilege." 65 The "moral
quality" referred to in the aforementioned quote is, when effected perfectly,
a "faculty.

58. See

' 66

Grotius then concludes his discussion by writing: "Civilians

THE CREATION OF STATES, supra

note 20, at 384-88.

59. Quebec, supra note 54, para. 131.
60. See id. para. 134, see also Aaland Islands Report, infra note 82, at 4-5.
61. See Quebec, supra note 54,
134; see also Aaland Islands Report, infra note

82, at 4.
62. Hugo Grotius was a Dutch lawyer and scholar widely considered to be the
father of modem international law. For further discussion on Grotius, his works, and his
importance to the field of international law see, e.g., CHRISTIAN GELLINEK, HUGO GROTIUS (1983); GROTIus READER, (L.E. van Holk & C.G. Roelofsen eds., 1983).
63. See HUGO GROT1US, ON THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE 7-9 (A.C. Campbell
trans. 2001).
64. Id. at 8.
65. Id.
66. Id.
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call a faculty that Right, which every man has to his own; but we shall
hereafter, taking it in its strict and proper sense, call it a right. This right
comprehends the power, that we have over ourselves, which is called
'67
liberty.
Grotius's conception of this "liberty" due to every man is the foundation of the right modern international law recognizes as self-determination.
By defining liberty as power over oneself Grotius argues man has the right
to determine his own path personally and also politically. 68 This liberty is a
faculty when expressed perfectly and-whether perfect or imperfect-is a
moral quality and thus a right.69 As rights justly entitle those who possess
them to a privilege, all men are justly entitled to the power over themselves
to determine their political future. 70 This power is what modern international law calls self-determination.
While Grotius's work provides the framework for much of modern
international law, progress has obviously been made. Particular strides were
made following World War I. The creation of the League of Nations symbolized a new era in international law. For the first time, sovereign states
banded together to create a permanent (or so it was thought to be) international body which would serve some form of global governing function.
The Covenant of the League of Nations, its founding document, is instructive on this shift. Notably, there is no discussion on the rights of the individual. 7 1 Indeed, the only time non-state actors are referenced throughout the
Covenant is in Article 22, where colonization is discussed and encouraged
in order to provide for the "well-being and development of such peoples"
who are "not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions
of the modern world."'72 While this Article notes that some groups, such as
those formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire, may be ready to be recog73
nized as independent nations, others are not deemed to be as advanced.
Specific reference is made to the people of Central and South-West Africa
along with those inhabiting many South Pacific Islands, as being yet unable74
to, for some reason or another, fend for themselves in the modern world.
In sum, the right of a people to self-determination has yet to emerge to the
point where it outweighs the interests of the "civilized" states.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 7-8.
See League of Nations Covenant.
Id. art. 22, para. 1.
Id. art. 22, para. 4.
Id. art. 22, paras. 5, 6.
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In this sense, the Covenant can be seen as a retreat from Grotius' academic idealism. Firmly grounded in realism, the Covenant made no attempt
to place all states and, indeed, all people on a like footing. 75 Keenly aware
of the human costs of World War I, the writers of the Covenant appear to
have been much more concerned with preserving the peace. Indeed, the first
line of the preamble indicates the purpose of the League of Nations was to
"promote the international co-operation and to achieve international peace
and security. ' 76 Specifically, it goes on to list the "obligation[ I] not to resort
to war" that all members would commit themselves to. 77 Article Sixteen
reinforces this purpose, declaring that any Member of the League making
war on another Member in violation of the Covenant will be assumed to
have declared war on the entirety of the League. 78 Even more, Members are
bound to supply military might to wage war against the offending nation. 79
Clearly the Covenant was written with a single-minded purpose: the prevention of future conflicts between established states.
The only discussion in the Covenant pertaining to secession, even tangentially, is the Article Ten mandate that the member States must "respect
and preserve" the "territorial integrity and existing political independence
of all Members of the League." 80 As will become apparent, references to the
importance of territorial integrity rarely bode well for secessionist movements. 81 This Article can be seen as the dawning of a pattern of conflict
between a people's right to self-determination and a State's right to territorial integrity.
While the Covenant of the League of Nations is not in and of itself
tremendously instructive on self-determination, the League of Nations era
as a whole is not so underwhelming for this task. In 1920, the League created a Commission of Rapporteurs to lend itself to a solution for what had

75. See id.

76. Id. pmbl.
77. Id. art. 12.

78. Id. art. 16, para. 1.
79. Id. art. 16, para. 2.
80. Id. art. 10. It is worth noting the dichotomy between the League of Nations
reference to territorial integrity and the UN expression of the same norm. The League's
Covenant indicates that territorial integrity it is to be preserved for all Member States,
whereas the UN Charter indicates it is a right due to all States, irrespective of membership status. See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
81. See infra text accompanying footnotes 83-139 (discussing the conflict between
territorial integrity and secession in the context of the Aaland Islands situation).
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become known as the Aaland Crisis. 82 The memorandum put forth by the
Commission outlined the then-existing state of international law with re83
spect to secession and, more largely, self-determination.
The Aaland Crisis itself can be traced back to the 1860s and the complex relationship between Russia and Finland. 84 Since that time Finland,
then a somewhat autonomous part of Russia, had regular governmental
meetings.85 This situation began to change in the 1890s when Russia engaged in a widespread policy of "Russification." 86 To effect this policy,
Russia issued the February Manifesto of 1899, placing the legislative mechanisms of Finland under the control of a new Governor-General.8 7 This continued until the Russian Revolution in 1917.88 Seizing the opportunity,
Finland declared itself independent in December 1917.89 Likely having
more pressing matters to contend with, 90 Vladimir Lenin recognized an independent Finland. 9'
Shortly after attaining its independence, Finland entered a period of
civil war.92 This conflict would prove to be the direct cause of the Aaland
Crisis. Many Aalanders were concerned for the future of Finland given the
civil war and uncertain relationship with Russia. 93 Indeed, the very same
82. See generally

JAMES BARROS, THE ALAND ISLANDS QUESTION: ITS SETrLE-

300-05 (elaborating on the creation of the Commission-termed by Barros the "Commission of Inquiry"-and its composition).
MENT BY THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

83. See Report Presentedto the Council of the League of Nationsby the Comm. of

Rapporteurs,League of Nations Doc. B7 21/68/106 (1921) [hereinafter Aaland Islands
Report].
84. Sia Spiliopoulou Aakermark, The Aaland Islands Questions in the League of
Nations: The Ideal Minority Case? 13 Y.B. POL. THOUGHT, CONCEPTUAL HIST. & FEMINIST THEORY

195, 198 (2009).

85. Id.

86. Id. "Russification" involves an increased emphasis on ethnic Russian culture
in an attempt to culturally homogenize the Russian state. For further discussion and
information see TUOMO POLVINEN, IMPERIAL BORDERLAND: BOBRIKOV AND THE ATTEMPTED RUSSIFICATION OF FINLAND,

1898-1904 18-22, (Steven Huxley trans.).

87. Aakermark, supra note 84, at 198.
88. Id.
89. Id.

90. Just a few months before Lenin had overseen the execution of the ruling Romanov family in an effort to consolidate his power. GREG KING & PENNY WILSON, THE
FATE OF THE RoMANovs 282-95 (2003) (discussing Lenin's involvement in the killing

of the Romanovs). For further discussion of the Russian Revolution generally and its
impact on Russia's foreign policy see COMPETING VOICES FROM THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION (Michael C. Hickey ed. 2011).
91. Aakermark, supra note 84, at 198.
92. Id.
93. See id. at 199.
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month Finland declared independence, the Aalanders began to petition the
Swedish government to reunify the Aaland Islands with Sweden. 94 Over
half of the voting population of the Aaland Islands would sign this petition. 95 Core to this desire for reunification were the similarities between the
Aalanders and Swedes in origin, language, and history. 96 A delegation from
the Aaland Islands expressed those thoughts saying "[t]he Aalanders's char'97
acter and mentality are of a Swedish nature.
Seeking to turn this rhetoric to action, the Aalanders established and
elected an unofficial governing body, the landsting, to work towards
reunification with Sweden. 98 The Aalander's arguments focused on the yetto-be clearly established idea of self-determination.9 9 This notion was furthered by post-World War I assertions of then-United States President
Woodrow Wilson.l°0 To further the notion that the Aalander's were seeking
self-determination, they enacted numerous parliamentary procedures and
mechanisms within the landsting, all aimed at framing the issue as one of
popular representation.' l0 The Commission itself was impressed by these
steps, especially the complete lack of violence employed by the Aalanders
in their quest to secede. 02 The Commission specifically found the Aalanders to be "[p]eaceable and law-abiding, [having] only employed the
means most calculated to gain the sympathies of civilised nations in order
10 3
to win their case."'
It is also necessary to note that a relevant third-party, Sweden, could
hardly be termed as disinterested in the situation. Sweden asserted two in94. See id.
95. See id.
96. See id.
97. See id.
98. See id.
99. See id. at 199-200; see also Aaland Islands Report, supra note 83 at 1, 4.
100. President Wilson was a great advocate for self-determination rights in the
wake of World War I. Wilson's suggestions for stronger language concerning the right
to self-determination did not, however, appear in the Covenant. In any event, the United
States did not join the League, limiting his impact even further. CLARENCE A. BERDAHL, THE POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES WITH RESPECT TO THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

7-13, 38 (1932). Despite these hurdles, President Wilson's thoughts clearly still had an
impact on then-existing political thought, with his conception of self-determination
rights being argued by the Aalanders and seemingly accepted as possessing some level
of authority by the Commission in its decision presented to the League. See Aaland
Islands Report, supra note 83 at 1.
101. Aakermark, supra note 84, at 199-200.
102. Aaland Islands Report, supra note 83, at 1.
103. Id.
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dependent interests for annexing the Aaland Islands.' °4 The first was to support the self-determination of the Aalanders, a people the Swedish had deep
cultural ties to.' 0 5 The Commission seemed to accept this rationale for
Swedish involvement, finding that Sweden "ha[d] no selfish rights" nor any
"annexationist views," but was only motivated by a "profound interest
aroused by men of her own race and by the fear that their fate may be a
' °6
precarious and unhappy one if they remain tied to another nationality."'
The second reason was far more strategic; the Swedes wanted to ensure the neutrality of the Aaland Islands, something particularly important
to Swedish defense interests given the location of the islands. 10 7 It is likely
that for this reason Sweden never produced an argument in the alternative
to the reunification of Sweden and the Aaland Islands. In a move that likely
severely-and perhaps fatally-undermined the argument that Sweden was
concerned for the rights of their cultural brothers, Sweden elected not to
argue that the Aaland Islands could be independent to affect their self-determination rights, even if not unified with Sweden. 0 8 Put most simply, Sweden argued all-or-nothing; the Aaland Islands should reunify with Sweden
to achieve their rights. 10 9
Finland's assertions focused on preserving the territorial integrity and
sovereignty of the Finnish state." 0 In this way, Finland first asserted any
debate over the status of the Aaland Islands was a political question; one
which ought to be handled domestically and internally."' Finland's assertion of its territorial integrity was so strong that it arrested two Aalander
leaders, Carl Bjorkman and Julius Sundblom for treason. 1 2 The men were
later convicted, but-perhaps as a result of the growing international controversy-given lighter sentences that they never actually were made to
Finland's alternative argument was that the Aalanders had ample
serve.'
access to self-determination rights and that the Finnish government had
taken numerous steps, both constitutional and legislative, to ensure that the
Aalanders had ample rights.' 14This argument may be responsible, at least in
part, for the effective nullification of Bjorkman and Sundblom's convic104.
105.
106.
107.

Aakermark, supra note 84, at 200.

Id.
Aaland Islands Report, supra note 83, at 1.
Aakermark, supra note 84, at 200.

108. Id.

109.
110.
Ill.
112.
113.
114.

See id.
Id.; see also Aaland Islands Report, supra note 83, at 1.
Aakermark, supra note 84, at 201.
Id. at 200.

Id.
Id. at 201.
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tions. The position of arguing that a minority population has ample rights
within a democracy while that same democracy almost simultaneously convicted two of the group's leaders for publically dissenting against the gov115
ernment is-at best-unenviable.
Viewing the competing arguments together, it is apparent that the
struggle between a state's sovereignty and territorial integrity and a people's right to self-determination has already emerged in international law.
To reconcile the two, the Commission attempted to find a compromise between the interests of both parties by employing a mixed strategy of what
has been termed "the carrot and the stick.' 116 The carrot served to incentivize and compensate compliance in the interest of finding a mutually beneficial solution. 1 7 The stick, unsurprisingly, served to coerce compliance
through less agreeable means. 18
The final determination of the Commission was that the Aaland Islands were not able to secede from Finland under then-existing international
law." 9 The Commission felt that "[t]he idea of justice and of liberty, embodied in the formula of self-determination, must be applied in a reasonable
manner to the relations between States and the minorities they include."' 20
Further, the rights of minorities must be respected as much as possible in a
civilized country, including self-determination and cultural rights.' 2' In a
sense, the Commission is discussing the aforementioned conflict between
self-determination and territorial integrity. 22 To reconcile the competing interests, the Commission asks a rhetorical question: "what reasons would
there be for allowing a minority to separate itself from the State to which it
is united, if this State gives it the guarantees which it is within its rights in
demanding, for the preservation of its social, ethical or religious character?"' 123 The Commission answers its own question by stating definitively

115. It should, however, be noted that the League of Nations Commission was
unimpressed by the Aalander's argument that the arrests of Bjorkman and Sundblom
constitute any sort of persecution of the Aalander people. The Commission was persuaded by Finland's argument that the men were in direct violation of aspects of Finland's penal code. Aaland Islands Report, supra note 83, at 4.
116. Aakermark, supra note 84, at 202.
117. See id.
118. See id.
119. Aaland Islands Report, supra note 83, at 5.
120. Id. at 4.
121. Id.
122. See id.
123. Id.
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that, "[s]uch indulgence... would be supremely unjust to the State prepared
12 4
to make these concessions."
For the Aalanders, this rule meant continued alignment with Finland. 25 In support of this section of its decision the Commission noted that
"[t]he new Finnish Constitution seems... to establish clearly enough equality between the two languages."' 2 6 In short, because the Finnish government
was willing to make certain concessions to allow the Aalanders the ability
to practice their culture, specifically continue to speak Swedish, they were
unable to secede. 27 The Commission did not shy away from recognizing
that its decision may well have been different under a different factual situation. 2 8 "If it were true that incorporation with Sweden [and with it, inherently, secession from Finland] was the only means of preserving its
Swedish language for Aaland, we should not have hesitated to consider this
solution." 2 9 In this way, the Commission reconciled the competing interests
of self-determination and territorial integrity. The Commission effectively
established a rule where a state is due its territorial integrity and, with it, the
ability to prevent secessions, where the state is providing for the rights of its
people.130 This is particularly relevant for minority populations within a
state, who likely lack the same levels of access to political mechanisms as
most in the same state. However, the Commission also left a door open for
secession in the event that states do not take steps, as the Commission
found Finland had, to preserve the rights of its minority populations.' 31 In
this case, a people may then have a right to secede in order to protect their
32
access to rights.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 5.
126. Id. at 6. It is worth noting that the Commission's assertion with respect to this
point seems vague and well-qualified. Upon one reading, that the constitution being
discussed "establishes[-] clearly enough[-]equality (punctuation added for clarity),"
the impression is given that the equality between the languages may be ambiguous;
certainly something which would be unacceptable to the Aalanders. The other possible
reading, that the Finnish constitution "establishes clearly[,] enough equality (punctuation added for clarity)," would also be unpalatable to the Aalanders who would certainly prefer to have equality of languages, rather than "enough" equality of languages.
Additionally, this reading of the decision would seem to border on oxymoronic. How
can a language have "enough" equality? Equality would seem to be binary-either it
exists or it does not. Id.
127. See id.
128. Id. at 5.
129. Id.
130. See id. at 4.
131. See id.
132. See id.
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While the Aalanders' plea for secession may have been denied, the
Commission clear!y rejected the notion that secession itself is completely
impermissible.' 33 The larger rule to be gleaned from the decision is, in fact,
quite the opposite. Secession, according the Commission, can be legally
permitted. 134 In the Commission's own words: "[t]he separation of a minority... can only be considered as an altogether exceptional solution, a last
resort when the State lacks either the will of the power to enact and apply
just and effective guarantees [of access to rights]."' 13 5 The Commission thus
explains that, in a situation where a state is failing to provide for the rights
of a people within its borders, those people may be able to express a right to
secession as a way to achieve their rights. 136 This can be done when a state
is unwilling to provide the rights to its people, such as a totalitarian state or
in the presence of a government-sanctioned policy of oppression. 137 It can
also be attained when a government, through either impotence, apathy, or a
combination of both, is incapable of protecting and providing rights to its
people. 138 The Commission tempers this right though, declaring that it is to
be used as a last resort; that is to say, all other reasonable options must have
failed a people before they may be able to secede legally. 139
B.

UN Era

The conclusion of World War II announced a radical shift in the organization of the world. The emerging superpowers, the United States and
the Soviet Union, would clash, establishing a bipolar globe. Caught somewhere between the two was the vast majority of remaining states. To ensure
this powder keg was never sparked, the global community endeavored to
create a new international governing body. Considering the failures of the
League of Nations to prevent war, the new body would need more power to
effectively mediate conflicts. The situation was thought to be particularly
40
dire as the next World War would have nuclear potential.
133. Id.

134. Id.
135. Id.
136. See id.
137. See id.
138. See id.

139. See id.
140. By 1949, the Soviet Union had joined the United States as a nuclear power,
plunging the world into the deepest part of the Cold War. The nuclear arms race only
grew for the next several decades rendering mutually assured destruction not just a
possibility but the policy of both superpowers. For more discussion of mutually assured
destruction and the Cold War nuclear arms race see, e.g., GETTING MAD: NUCLEAR
MUTUAL ASSURED DESTRUCTION, ITS ORIGINS AND PRACTICE

(Henry D. Sokolski, ed.,
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The UN was created out of the ashes of World War II, and with the
memory of the Holocaust still freshly burned into the international psyche.
The world had seen the results of the dual failures of the League of Nations.
First, it had failed its main objective: it had not prevented the next "great
war." Even worse, it had failed to prevent the human rights atrocities that
came along with the Second World War. The Holocaust, the Rape of Nanking, and countless other tragedies had transpired on the watch of the League
of Nations. The new international organization, the UN, would be more
well-equipped to mediate and prevent conflict. Not only that, but it would
also serve to protect, preserve, and grow human rights, an emerging facet in
international law. Necessitated by the scars of the inhumane acts that occurred during the war, human rights would become a core value to the UN.
A value that, unlike in the Covenant of the League of Nations, would be
enshrined in the founding documents of the new United Nations.
1. UN Documents/Conventions/Covenants/International

Agreements

The UN Charter was a vast step forward for human rights, particularly
the right to self-determination.' 4' Where the Covenant of the League of Nations focuses squarely on the state as the sole actor in the international
world, 42 the UN Charter also makes room to discuss human beings as individuals. 43 The Charter asserts that, while the state remains the main actor in
the international community, individual people also have rights.' 44 Key
among these rights for the purposes of secession are the rights to self-determination and the rights of non-self-governing territories.
The self-determination rights of all people are enshrined in article one
of the UN Charter. 45 Paragraph two of that article provides that one of the
purposes of the UN is "[t]o develop friendly relations among nations based
on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal
2004). Perhaps the most vivid and famous expression of this thought comes from Manhattan Project veteran Albert Einstein who is said to have opined: "I do not know how
the Third World War will be fought, but I can tell you what they will use in the
Fourth-Rocks!" ALICE CALAPRICE, THE NEW QUOTABLE EINSTEIN 173 (2005).
141. CompareCharter of the League of Nations, with U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 2.
142. See supra text accompanying footnotes 71-80.
143. See U.N. Charter art. I, para. 2 (discussing rights of people).
144. See, e.g., U.N. Charter art. I, para. 2 (providing self-determination rights to
all people); U.N. Charter art. I, para. 3 (ensuring all people are due human rights,
irrespective of race, sex, and religion); U.N. Charter art. 73 (indicating the rights due to
individuals living in non-self-governing territories).
145. U.N. Charter art. 1,para. 2.
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peace." 146 Article seventy-three of the UN Charter echoes similar sentiment
with respect to non-self-governing territories. 147 This article restrains UN
member states to ensure that the cultures of non-self-governing peoples are
respected and cultivated. 148 Even more impressive, the article places the
burden on member states to aid in the "develop[ment of] self-government
[within non-self-governing territories], to take due account of the political
aspirations of the peoples, and to assist them in the progressive develop49
ment of their free political institutions."'
Years after the creation of the UN and its Charter took force, another
international treaty, the International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination ("ICERD") was created. 50 This treaty,
which entered into force in 1969, furthered the racial protections afforded
under international law.151 Just one year later, the ICJ determined that several provisions of the ICERD represented erga omnes norms of international law. 52 Article fifteen, paragraph two reaffirms the rights of those
peoples living in non-self-governing territories. 153 These rights are
important
[p]ending the achievement of the objectives of the Declaration on the
Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples... the

provisions of this Convention shall in no way limit the right of petition granted to these peoples by other international instruments or by
54
the United Nations and its specialized agencies. 1
In this way, the Convention is again reinforcing self-determination-it is
preserving the rights of non-self-governing people until such a time when
they are able to achieve a full measure of self-determination. '55
Additionally, the Covenant specifically enumerates many rights which
people have irrespective of race. 156 By providing more rights due to all peo146. Id.
147. See U.N. Charter art. 73.
148. See id.

149. See id.
150. See G.A. Res. 2106 (XX), International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2106 (XX) (Dec. 21, 1965) [hereinafter ICERD].
151. See id.
152. BROWNLIE'S, supra note 26, at 645 (citing Case Concerning Barcelona Traction, Light, and Power Co., Ltd. (BeIg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 1, para. 24 (Feb. 5) (finding the protection from racial discrimination to be an obligation erga omnes).
153. ICERD, supra note 150, art. 15, para. 2.
154. See id. para. 1.
155. See id. art. 15.
156. Id. art. 5.
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pie, the Covenant also presents more ways people may be subject to rights
violations. 57 Most simply, by having more rights, people may now be subject to more rights violations. 58 As a result of this, it is easier for certain
peoples to make the argument that they are being subjected to rights violations.' 59 Accordingly, their right to self-determination may more readily
give way to a right to external self-determination and secession so as to
60
preserve a people's other rights, such as those guaranteed by the ICERD.
The International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
("ICESCR")' 61 and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
("ICCPR") 62 are also instructive as to the extent of the right to self-determination. Both Covenants share a common first article. 163 The first paragraph of this article states unequivocally "[a]il peoples have the right of
self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political states and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development." 64 The ICESCR and ICCPR, with 160 and 167 parties, respectively,
as of 2012, are considered to be binding law on those states party to the
Conventions. 65 With such a significant acceptance by states, scholars have
asserted that the ICESCR and ICCPR may constitute customary international law, 166 making their provisions binding on all states, not just those
67
party to the agreements.
1970 would see one of the strongest conceptions of the right to selfdetermination to date with the adoption of UN General Assembly Resolution 25/2625.168 This resolution, titled the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-Operation among
157. Id.
158. See id.
159. See id.
160. Id.; Aaland Islands Report, supra note 83, at 4.
161. G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, U.N. Doc. A/RES/21/2200 (Dec. 16, 1966) [hereinafter ICESCR].
162. G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, U.N. Doc. A/RES/21/2200 (Dec. 16, 1966) [hereinafter ICCPR].
163. ICESCR, supra note 161, art. 1;ICCPR, supra note 162, art. 1.
164. Id.
165. BROWNLIE'S, supra note 26, at 638.

166. See generally, Beth Simmons, Civil Rights in InternationalLaw: Compliance
with Aspects of the "InternationalBill of Rights," 16 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 437

(2009) (discussing the potential for the ICCPR and ICESCR to be considered customary
international law).
167. BROWNLIE'S, supranote 26, at 23-30 (discussing customary international law
generally).
168. G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-Operation among States in Accordance with the
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States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, 169 has become
known commonly as the Friendly Relations Declaration. Recognized by the
ICJ as customary international law, 170 the Friendly Relations Declaration is
binding on all states. 171This is of great impact because the Declaration contains some of the most forceful language on self-determination to be found
in international law. 172 According to the Declaration "[e]very State has the
duty to refrain from any forcible action which deprives peoples... of their
' The Friendly
right to self-determination and freedom and independence."173
Relations Declaration continues to place a duty on states to recognize that
self-determination rights allow all peoples to determine their political status
and that states not only may not hinder this exercise of rights, but must
174
actively promote the use of this right.
Despite the utility of these statements for those seeking to exercise
self-determination, the Friendly Relations Declaration is most unique for
one specific proposition. The Declaration states that:
[t]he establishment of a sovereign and independent State, the free association or integration with an independent State or the emergence
into any other political status freely determined by a people constitute
modes of implementing the right of self-determination by that
75

people. 1

This seemingly innocuous language represents a titanic shift in the understanding of self-determination by the international community. The Declaration is recognizing that the right to self-determination can be invoked to
establish a sovereign and independent state. 176 The functional effect of this
is to recognize that the creation of a new state-secession--is indeed an
1 77
expression of self-determination rights.
The Friendly Relations Declaration, perhaps in an effort to compromise with the firm statement that secession can be an expression of selfCharter of the United Nations, U.N. Doc. A/RES/25/2625 (Oct. 24, 1970) [hereinafter
Friendly Relations Declaration].
169. Id.
170. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, paras. 188, 191, 264 (June 27) [hereinafter Nicaragua]
(finding the Friendly Relations Declaration to be customary international law).
171. See BROWNLIE'S, supra note 26, at 23-30 (indicating the consequences of
customary international law).
172. See Friendly Relations Declaration, supra note 168.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. See id.
177. See id.
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determination
integrity: 178

rights,

also contains

a clause

reinforcing

territorial

Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorizing
or encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally
or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and
independent States conducting themselves in compliance with the
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples as described above and thus possessed of a government representing the
whole people belonging to the territory without distinction as to race,
1 79
creed or colour.

While at first glance, this seems to bode ill for a people's ability to secede,
such a harsh interpretation is unfounded.
This language, instead, reconciles the decades-old conflict between
territorial integrity and external self-determination rights. 180 The underlying
rule is that a state's territorial integrity is to be respected as indivisible contingent upon the state respecting the rights and self-determination of all
peoples within its borders.' 8' In this way, a state failing to effectuate its
people's rights or self-determination has violated its obligation to the international community.' 82 As a consequence of this, said state is not entitled to
have its territorial integrity respected and the people or peoples whose
rights are being violated have the right to express their external self-deter83
mination and secede to access their rights.
The Helsinki Final Act of 1975 is also instructive on the growth of the
right to self-determination in international law. 184 The Act was signed by
thirty-five states, including the United States and the Soviet Union, along
with their NATO and Warsaw Pact allies. 85 Overtime, the Act has become
more broadly applicable. 86 This Act, held to be indicative of customary
international law by the ICJ in its Nicaragua decision, 87 also affirms that
self-determination rights can be utilized by a people outside of their state.' 88
The most telling statement of the Act indicates that the right to self-determi178. Id.
179. Id.
180.
181.
182.
183.

See
See
See
See

id.
id.
id.
id.

184. See Conference on Security and Co-Operation in Europe: Final Act, Helsinki
1975 (Aug. 1, 1975) [hereinafter Helsinki Final Act].
185. BROWNLIE'S, supra note 26, at 637.
186. See id.
187. Nicaragua, supra note 170, paras. 189, 204, 269.
188. Helsinki Final Act, supra note 184, art. VIII.
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nation grants a people the right "to determine, when and as they wish, their
internal and external political status."' 189 In this way, the Act recognizes and
confirms that the right to self-determination includes the ability of a people
to determine their external political status.190
2.

Judicial Determinations

Despite the utility of the international agreements discussed above in
determining the status of self-determination and secession in international
law, they represent only a portion of the law available. Judicial decisions
and opinions are also highly instructive in determining the status of the
issue in international law.
The ICJ first grappled with the issue of self-determination in its advisory opinion concerning the situation in Namibia. 191 The situation in
Namibia arose from the continued occupation of South Africa within the
territory of Namibia. 192 Decades before the issue before the Court existed,
South Africa was granted a League of Nations mandate to administer the
territory of Namibia, then known as German South West Africa. 93 Following the replacement of the League Nations by the UN, this mandate was
replaced by a trusteeship. 94 After implementation of a policy of apartheid
95
in Namibia, South Africa was stripped of its trusteeship over the territory.1
South Africa remained in control of Namibia after this relationship ended,
prompting a Security Council resolution condemning the continued occupation. 196 In defiance of this resolution, South Africa continued to occupy
Namibia, prompting a request for an advisory opinion on the legal ramifica97
tions of South Africa's actions.
Self-determination rights of people were crucial to the Court's determination. The Court noted that the UN Charter made self-determination
rights accessible to all people residing in non-self-governing territories. 98
The Court then held that South Africa's continued presence in Namibia was
illegal because it violated the self-determination rights of the Namibian
189. Id.
190. See id.
191. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in
Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970),
Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. Reports 16 (June 21) [hereinafter Namibia].
192. Namibia, supra note 191, para. 1.
193. Id. para. 49.
194. Id. para. 76.
195. Id. paras. 128-31.
196. S.C. Res. 276 (Jan. 30, 1970)
197. Namibia, supra note 191, para. 42.
198. Id. para. 52.
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people. 199 In holding as such, the Court accepted the notion that self-determination rights are legally enforceable. 2 00 Namibia thus stands for the proposition that a violation of self-determination rights may give those
suffering from the violation legal recourse.
Four years later the ICJ again addressed self-determination, this time
in its Western Sahara advisory opinion. 20 1 Western Sahara arose out of a
dispute between Morocco and Mauritania concerning a disputed territory,
Western Sahara. 20 2 The region, initially colonized by Spain, was going
through the process of decolonization when both Morocco and Mauritania
laid claims to the territory. 20 3 In an effort to resolve the conflict, the Generally Assembly called upon the ICJ to answer two questions in an advisory
decision. First, at the time of colonization by Spain was Western Sahara
terra nuilius?2 °4 And, second, if not, what were the legal ties to Morocco
and Mauritania? 20 5 In evaluating these questions, the Court found the law of
20 6
self-determination to be useful.
As it applies to the topic of secession, Western Sahara dealt exten20 7
sively with the application of the self-determination right of a people.
The Court specifically discussed the conception of the right put forth by the
General Assembly in its Declaration on the Granting of Independence to
Colonial Countries and Peoples. 20 8 In this declaration, the right to self-determination is discussed as a right of the peoples. 2°9 Accordingly, self-determination is not a right for a state to exercise on behalf of its people, but
rather, is a right granted innately to a people. 2 10 Self-determination need not
be a right grated by a state for its people to effect it.211 Indeed, because it is
a right to people, it may well be used against a state should a conflict arise
between the two parties. 21 2 The Court concluded by noting that Western
Sahara was not terra nullius and it had legal ties to both Mauritania and
199. Id. paras. 52, 53, 133.
200. See id. paras. 52, 53.
201. Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. Reports 12 (Oct. 16) [hereinafter Western Sahara].
202. Id. para. I.
203. Id.
204. Id. Terra nullius refers to the notion of land belonging to no one.
205. Id.
206. Id. paras. 54-59, 71, 162.
207. Id. paras. 54-55.
208. Id. para. 55.
209. Id.
210. See id.
211. See id.
212. See id.
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Morocco, though neither state had sufficient ties to claim sovereignty over
Western Sahara.2 13 Failing to find either of these ties to constitute sovereignty, the Court held that the self-determination of the people ought to be
21 4
the determining factor in its political alignment.
The debate over secession and self-determination has not been limited
to international courts. Domestic jurisdictions have also struggled with applying the murky standards that have evolved over time. One of the most
cited cases on secession comes from a domestic court, the Canadian Supreme Court, Canada's highest judicial body. 215 Following growing secessionist sentiment in Quebec, the Canadian Governor in Council submitted a
216
request for an advisory opinion to the Canadian Supreme Court.
The court was faced with three questions to fully determine the issue at
hand. 21 7 The first was: "Under the Constitution of Canada, can the National
Assembly, legislature or government of Quebec effect the secession of Quebec from Canada unilaterally?" 2 8 Effectively, question one is relatively
simple; the Governor in Council is asking whether Canadian domestic law
has some mechanism by which Quebec, or a governmental body representing Quebec, may effect a unilateral secession. 2 19 Being a determination on
domestic law, the court's determination that Canadian law does not allow
220
for unilateral secession is of limited value to this analysis.
The second question is significantly more complex and is composed of
two parts. 22 1 It reads:
Does international law give the National Assembly legislature or
government of Quebec the right to effect the secession of Quebec
from Canada unilaterally? In this regard, is there a right to self-determination under international law that would give the National Assembly, legislature or government of Quebec the right to effect the
222
secession of Quebec from Canada unilaterally?
213. Id. para. 162.
214. See id.
215. This may perhaps be because it is easily the most accessible domestic case
directly on the subject. The United States Supreme Court itself wrestled with the issue
in 1869 when a state (somewhat predictably, Texas) asserted a right to secede. The
court roundly rejected Texas's argument that it was entitled to secession. Texas v.
White, 74 U.S. 700 (1868).
216. Quebec, supra note 54, para. 2.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. See id. para. 107.
221. See id. para. 2.
222. Id.
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As asserted above, the second question put to the court has, in fact,
two parts of arguable distinction. 223 The first part asks the court generally
whether any standard or rule of extant international law could give Quebec
the right to unilaterally secede. 224 The second part does not truly ask a distinct question but, instead, refines and clarifies the first.225 It directs the
court to specifically consider whether a right to self-determination under
international law exists and, if so, if that right could give rise to a means for
226
Quebec to unilaterally secede from Canada.
To answer this question, the court surveys numerous sources of international law and comes to the conclusion that secession is permitted under
international law in three cases. 227 One of the first points addressed by the
court was the argument that, in international law generally, there is a presumption that anything not explicitly prohibited is permitted. 228 This asser229
tion likely stems from the Permanent Court of International Justice's
decision in its S.S. Lotus case. 230 The S.S. Lotus case is known for establishing what is now known as the Lotus Principle. 23 ' Simply put, the principle
supports the notion that an action not specifically prohibited by international law may be assumed to be permitted. 232 The court largely declines to
address the Lotus Principle, noting only that in the case of unilateral secession, the denial necessary under the Lotus Principle may be implicit be223. See id. para. 2. The distinction between the two sections is dubious because,
as will be discussed supra in section V of this article, the effects of the self-determination referenced by the second part of the second question is the most likely and realistic
source of the right to unilateral secession asked about in the first part of that question.
Accordingly, the second half of the question functions more as a clarification and directive to the court. It serves to instruct the court to specifically consider and evaluate the
merits of an argument asserting the legality of unilateral secession stemming from the
right to self-determination. In doing so, it cannot be said to be asking the court an
altogether different question.
224. Id.
225. See id.
226. Id.
227. Id. paras. 132-34.
228. Id. para. I 1l.
229. The ironically named Permanent Court of International Justice was the predecessor court to the ICJ. As such, it served the League of Nations in much the same way
that the ICJ serves the UN.
230. S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 (Sept. 7).
231. See id. paras. 46, 53, 60, 65, 73 (establishing the principle that, in international law, an action not specifically prohibited may be assumed to be permitted).
232. See id.
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cause of the "exceptional circumstances required for secession to be
233
permitted under the right of a people to self-determination."
The court uses this to segue into a discussion on the right to self-determination and the extent of such a right.234 The court starts by noting that,
while international law predominantly views the state as the primary actor,
certain rights of non-state actors are recognized. 235 Among these rights is
the right of people to self-determination. 236 The court then runs through
several international conventions and resolutions affirming the right of people to self-determination, some of which were discussed supra. 237 It is noted
specifically that "the sheer number of resolutions concerning the right of
self-determination make their enumeration impossible. 2 38
Having established that a right to self-determination does exist under
extant international law, the Canadian Supreme Court turned to addressing
the scope of that right. 23 9 Self-determination is generally meant to be exercised internally.2 40 That is to say, "a people's pursuit of its political, economic, social and cultural development within the framework of an existing
state. '24' However, in some rare cases, self-determination may be exercised
externally. 242 A people may establish a sovereign and independent nation if
the same people is incapable of effecting its self-determination rights
243
internally.
These rare cases fall into three general categories. 244 First, the right of
colonized peoples to use their right to self-determination to separate from a
colonial power.245 The court found that this particular case was so well documented within international law that it is an "undisputed" right of colonized people. 246 Second, the court finds it a "clear case" that a people have a
right to secession through external self-determination where it is "subject to
alien subjugation, domination or exploitation. 2 47 This right may occur
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.

Quebec, supra note 54, para. 112.
See id. paras. 113-22, 126-30.
Id. para. 113.
Id.
See id. paras. 114-22.
Id. para. 117.
Id. para. 126.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id. paras. 132-34.
Id. para. 132.
Id.
Id. para. 133.
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outside of the colonial context. 248 This second means to secession-where a
people may secede when faced with subjugation and exploitation-is referring to remedial secession. 249 The court also notes the potential for a third
means: secession being permissible where a people have no meaningful
way to exercise self-determination internally, they may, as a last resort, be
entitled to secede in order to gain the ability to access their right. 250 These
three situations are later synthesized, with the court stating "[i]n all three
situations, the people in question are entitled to a right to external selfdetermination because they have been denied the ability to exert internally
their right to self-determination. ' 25' This understanding of the rule is extremely similar to the League of Nations Commission of Rapporteur's determination with respect to the Aaland Islands, where it was determined that
which
a minority population may only secede when they are part of a 2state
52
rights.
their
to
access
them
guarantee
to
is unwilling or unable
Applying the facts present to the framework established, the court determined that Quebec lacked the legal ability to secede under international
law, just as it did under Canadian domestic law. 253 Quebec was not currently existing in a colonial context, rendering the first means of secession
inoperable according to the court. 254 Similarly, the people of Quebec cannot
be said to be an oppressed people, preventing them from accessing remedial
secession. 255 With respect to the final means of permissible secession, "[t]he
population of Quebec cannot plausibly be said to be denied access to government. 2 56 Having failed to meet the criteria for any of the three exceptional circumstance which would have allowed secession, Quebec was
257
denied the ability to secede.
The final question posed to the Canadian Supreme Court asks, "[i]n
the event of a conflict between domestic and international law on the right
of the National Assembly, legislature or government of Quebec to effect the
secession of Quebec from Canada unilaterally, which would take precedence in Canada?" 25 8 The Governor in Council appeared concerned with the
potential for conflict between domestic and international law and sought
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.

Id.
See id.
Id. para. 134.
Id. para. 138.
Aaland Islands Report, supra note 83, at 4.
Quebec, supra note 54, para. 138.
Id. para. 154.
Id.
Id. para. 136.
Id. para. 138.
Id. para. 2.
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clarification as to which would apply should the two be found to be incongruent. 259 In any event, the court determined that there was no conflict between domestic and international law, because both indicated that Quebec
lacked the legal right to secede under either legal system. 26° Accordingly,
the court determined that there was no need to address the third question
26
further. '
The closest the ICJ has yet to come to ruling directly on the issue of
secession was in its advisory opinion on the situation in Kosovo. 262 In Kosovo, the court was asked to determine the legality of a unilateral declaration of independence. 263 The court relied heavily on the self-determination
principle to come to the conclusion that the people of Kosovo had the legal
right to unilaterally declare their independence from Serbia. 264 This decision
paved the way for states to recognize an independent Kosovo and, in effect,
2 65
allow for Kosovo's secession.
The Kosovo case arises from what the UN Security Council termed the
"grave humanitarian situation" in Kosovo. 266 The Security Council specifically admonished the "violence and repression in Kosovo. '' 267 In response to
this, a UN coalition was sent into the region to prevent further violence. 268
On February 17, 2008, Kosovo adopted a declaration of independence in an
259. Id.
260. Id. para. 147.

261. Id.
262. Worthy of note during a discussion of the ICJ's advisory opinion in Kosovo
is the fact that the ICJ allowed the people that would come to be the people of Kosovo,
then a sub-state group, to submit documents to the Court. This in and of itself certainly
evidences a changing attitude towards the treatment of sub-state entities under international law generally, and before the ICJ specifically. Indeed, there is significant evidence of the Court allowing such groups-groups one scholar has termed "aspiring
states"-to have a voice before it. For further discussion on Kosovo's status before the
ICJ in the Kosovo advisory opinion and the status of aspiring states generally, see Shana
Tabak, Aspiring States, 64 BuFF.L. REV. (forthcoming May 2016).
263. See Kosovo, supra note 57, paras. 1, 51.
264. See id. para. 123.
265. To date over 100 states have recognized Kosovo as an independent state. The
European Union is currently facilitating discussions between Serbia and Kosovo to take
steps towards Serbia's recognition of Kosovo's independence. Kosovo has also begun
to take steps towards European Union Membership. U.S. RELATIONS WITH Kosovo,
U.S. DEPT.OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/100931.htm (Mar. 17, 2016).
266. Kosovo, supra note 57, para. 58.
267. Id.
268. Id.
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effort to politically distance itself from Serbia and, presumably, the violence that came with it.269
The Kosovo Court begins its analysis by noting that self-determination
rights have developed to give a right of independence to peoples subjected
to subjugation, domination, or exploitation, in effect large-scale human
rights violations. 270 While the determination of the lawfulness of the declaration of independence was based largely on grounds that a declaration of
independence does not, in and of itself, violate a state's territorial integrity,
the Court notes that many states present in the proceedings discussed the
issue before the Court in the context of remedial secession. 27' The Court,
however, found it unnecessary to provide a determination on either the legality of remedial secession or its application to the situation in Kosovo.

272

In making this determination, it is noted that "[t]he General Assembly has
requested the Court's opinion only on whether or not the declaration of
independence is in accordance with international law.

2

73

Kosovo provides favorable law relative to remedial secession in two
ways. The first is the re-affirming of the ability of a people to seek its
independence when subjected to subjugation, domination, or exploitation.
In this way, it is arguable that the Court is addressing, and more importantly, accepting, remedial secession by another name. 274 The second important note is that the Court elected to not rule on the idea of remedial
secession.2 75 While it is certainly true that the Court could have taken this
opportunity to affirm the right of remedial secession in some, limited circumstances, it is more important-given the trend towards expanding selfdetermination rights-that it did not reject the right out of hand.
What the Court refused to do in its advisory opinion, recognize the
legitimacy of remedial secession, Judges Antonio Augusto Canqado
Trindade and Abdulqawi Yusuf seem to have done so in their individual
separate opinions. Judge Canqado Trindade asserted that the traditional in269. See id. para. 57.
270. See id. para. 79.
271. Id. paras. 80-82.
272. Id. para. 83.
273. Id.
274. Remedial secession is done to cure human rights violations. Thus, for the
Court to state that a people may exercise its right to self-determination to gain independence (secession) when subjected to subjugation, domination, or exploitation (assuredly
something that would constitute human rights violations under the ICCPR, ICESCR,
and many other sources of law), is for the Court to approve of remedial secession without saying it explicitly. Presumably, this is to avoid the connotation associate with the
word "secession."
275. Id.
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ter-State interpretation (where a state is the smallest recognized actor in the
international system and sub-state entities are not recognized in the international community) of international law is actively being overcome. 276 In
support of this notion, Judge Cangado Trindade makes clear that presently
non-self-governing territories have a unique status vis-ii-vis the State administering them. 277 This different status exists to protect the right to selfdetermination of the peoples within the non-self-governing territory. 27 8
Thus, the "purely inter-State paradigm of classic international law" has
been, and continues to be, eroded by present developments. 279 Indeed, "[i]n
the current evolution of international law, international practice. . . provides
support for the exercise of self-determination by peoples under permanent
adversity or systemic repression, beyond the traditional confines of the historical process of decolonization. '280 Judge Canqado Trindade is accordingly noting that, irrespective of the traditional understanding of
international law and its bounds, current practice is supportive to the idea of
remedial secession in the event of "permanent adversity or systemic repression. ' 28 1 This is a direct result of the fact that "[c]ontemporary international
law is no longer insensitive to patterns of systemic oppression and
28s2
subjugation.
Judge Yusuf offered an even more direct and powerful sentiment, writing separately to note that while "[s]urely, there is not general positive right
under international law which entitles all ethnically or racially distinct
groups within existing States to claim separate statehood... [t]his does not,
however, mean that international law turns a blind eye to the plight of such
groups. '283 Instead, "the right of peoples to self-determination may support
a claim to separate statehood. '284 This may only occur though where a state
not only prevents these peoples from exercising their right to self-determination, but "also subject them to discrimination, persecution and egregious
violations of human rights or humanitarian law. ' 285 Judge Yusuf thus con-

cludes that under existing international law:
if a State fails to comport itself in accordance with the principle of
equal rights and self-determination of peoples, an exceptional situa276. Id. para. 183 (separate opinion by Cangado Trindade, J.).
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.

Id.
Id.
Id. para. 184.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Id. paras. 10-11 (separate opinion by Yusuf, J.).
Id. para. 11.
Id.
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tion may arise whereby the ethnically or racially distinct group denied internal self-determination may claim a right of external selfdetermination or separation from the State which could effectively
286
put into question the State's territorial unity and sovereignty.
Taking all of the present legal authority together and-more importantly-viewing the historical trend, one can see the evolution of the right
to self-determination. The right has grown in both force and scope from the
time of Grotius to the modern era. What was, even at the time of the UN's
formation, an almost academic ideal for the international community to
reach towards has evolved into a legally enforceable right of all people.
This right now includes the ability to, in limited circumstances, express
itself externally. Such external self-determination may even take the form
of secession when the state to which the people expressing the right are a
part of fails to uphold its obligations to provide all of its citizens their
human rights, including an effective measure of internal self-determination.
As the right has progressed, a clear trend favoring the rights of people rather
than those of the state emerges. The next logical step in this progression is a
clear, enforceable rule by which a people may enforce their self-determination against a state and secede.
IV.

REMEDIAL SECESSION AS A

Per Se Right

One of the most controversial pieces of the secession debate is the
fervent dispute over remedial secession not as an expression of self-determination, but, rather, as a per se stand-alone right. While remedial secession is often discussed independently of self-determination rights,2 87 the two
are inseparable. As discussed at length in section IV of this comment, the
Quebec decision outlines three legal mechanisms for secession.2 88 The second mechanism being when a people are subjected to alienation, domination, or exploitation;2 89 and the third being when a people are unable to
2 90
effectuate self-determination within their state.
This section of this comment seeks to establish that these two means of
achieving legal secession are defacto the same and, accordingly, should not
be treated differently. This is because, under relevant international law, a
people subjected to the alienation, domination, or exploitation referenced by
286. Id. para. 12.
287. See Quebec, supra note 54, paras. 133-34 (separating secession for purposes

of correcting the exploitation and domination of people from secession done as an expression of external self-determination when internal self-determination is unavailable).
288. Id. paras. 132-34.
289. Id. para. 133.
290. Id. para. 134.
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the court in Quebec would, in theory, lack any effective means of selfdetermination. 291 Similarly, a people lacking any means for sufficient selfdetermination within their state would likely-if not inherently and by definition-be facing human rights violations which can be said to rise to the
292
level of alienation, domination, or exploitation.
To expand on this issue, a hypothetical is useful. If a people within a
country lack acceptable access to self-determination they are inherently suffering alienation, domination, or exploitation. We know this for several reasons. The first is that self-determination in and of itself is a human right.
Absent access to this right, a people are inherently suffering from the domination necessary to effect secession. Additionally, if a people were completely denied access to their self-determination rights there would have to
be some mechanism by which their state would put them into such a situation. This mechanism would presumably require the violation of other
human rights, specifically those enshrined in the ICCPR, among other international agreements. 293 To prevent a specific group or people from exercising their self-determination rights, a state would inherently have to enact a
policy which treated that group or people distinctly from the remainder of
294
their compatriots. In doing so, an ICCPR violation would occur.
Just as a lack of self-determination rights is indicative of a policy of
alienation, domination, or exploitation, evidence of such egregious human
rights violations which rise to the level of alienation, domination, or exploitation will, inherently, mean that the people subject to such a policy
have no meaningful access to self-determination. For evidence of this, one
need look no further than the definition of self-determination. Numerous
previously discussed international agreements conclude that self-determination entails control over ones political situation. 295 If a people finds itself in
a situation where it is subject to human rights violations it can be inferred
that the people in question has little to no effective control over its political
situation. No people would voluntarily create, or allow to be created, a political system that would subject them to human rights violations. In this
way, we can know that a people suffering human rights violations on the
291. See supra text accompanying footnotes 281-282 (arguing that a people with
effective internal self-determination would be incapable of preventing their own alienation, domination, and exploitation).
292. See supra text accompanying footnote 283.
293. ICCPR, supra note 162, art. 2.
294. Id. (providing that a state must treat its citizens "without distinction of any

kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or
social origin, property, birth or other status.").
295. See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 162, art. 1; ICESCR, supra note 161, art. 1;
Friendly Relations Declaration, supra note 168.
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scale of alienation, domination, or exploitation lacks control over its political situation. Accordingly, it can be inferred that such a people is also lacking self-determination rights.
Thus, the two types of secession discussed by the court in Quebec,
secession to cure a people's alienation, domination, or exploitation and secession to achieve a degree of self-determination, are identical in practice.
As such, future scholarship and debate concerning the legality of secession
would be best served to treat the two as a uniform entity-one legal right to
remedial secession in certain, limited circumstances. This understanding
provides a clearer, more cogent synthesis of the existing law-from all
sources, not simply the Quebec decision-concerning secession.
CONCLUSION

As has been shown, a legitimate right to remedial secession-in certain, limited circumstances-can be found under currently existing international law. When a people is subject to a circumstance where they cannot
access the mechanisms of self-determination within their states, as is their
right under international law, they may seek external self-determination to
remedy this situation. Similarly, when a people is subject to subjugation
such that they are suffering large-scale human rights violations, they can
access a right to remedial secession to prevent further human rights abuses.
These two aforementioned justifications for secession are, indeed, one
in the same. As international law has developed, the reality has arisen that
any people lacking any effective means of internal self-determination will
be inherently suffering human rights violations, most obviously their right
to self-determination. This is as true as is the converse; any people subject
to domination and exploitation such that they are suffering significant
human rights violations will not be able to achieve meaningful self-determination within their state. If they were, why would they not act through the
political process to end their suffering? As the distinction between these
two has become practically meaningless, there can be said to exist one right
to secession outside of a colonial context.
This conception of remedial secession is not, in itself, new. It is merely
a refinement of existing international law. Remedial secession exists as a
right to a people where that people is suffering a wide-spread policy of
human rights violations. That policy of human rights violations may include
a policy by which the people are unable to effect meaningful internal selfdetermination. Put most simply, the human right being violated need not be
something commonly thought of as a human rights violation; something of
the severity of slavery or apartheid. A policy by which a people are denied
their human right to self-determination may be sufficient to allow for a right
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to remedial secession under presently-existing international law. Further
scholarship is required to make a definitive determination on the potential
applicability of this rule for remedial secession to any currently existing
separatist movements.
PRESCRIPTION

Above all else, the international law concerning secession can best be
described as nebulous. Despite this astonishing lack of clarity-even when
considered relative to other issues in international law, a famously murky
and, at times, quixotic, discipline-some conclusions may be drawn.
Perhaps even more important to the future of the legality of secession
than any judicial decision or example of state practice is the reality that the
right to self-determination is constantly evolving. Quite simply, the march
of progress is slow but certain. Indeed, it may seem that the next logical
step in the ICJ's case law is to conclude that the right to self-determination
may, in some circumstances, give rise to a right to secession. Numerous
instances of secession or attempted secession are likely to occur in the coming years and decades; and, with third-party states likely to become involved the opportunity for the Court to speak on secession in the way it
declined to do so in Kosovo may well present itself. By taking this step, the
Court will be able to clarify the status of secession in international law for
the benefit of all states and peoples. In doing so, the Court may also be able
to effect a lasting change that may finally allow a clearly-articulated means
for an oppressed people to come before the international community and
take steps to remediate the harm being done to them.
Since the dawn of the UN-era, international law has alternatively
served two masters. On one hand, the law felt the legacies of the League of
Nations and focused on the rights of the state as the sole actor in the international world. In opposition stands Enlightenment influences and a postWorld War II focus on ever-growing human rights norms and ideals. In the
context of secession, these two histories support, respectively, the notion of
territorial integrity and the right to self-determination up to, and including,
secession. It is time that this conflict be reconciled definitively. It is time
that the law takes legitimate, effective steps towards preventing another
Rwanda or Kosovo. It is time that the oft-cited and never enforced mantra
of "never again" become actionable. The world and, indeed, international
law is ready for it. All that remains is for the International Court of Justice
to recognize and affirm remedial secession definitively.

